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Abstract. Cryptomarkets (or darknet markets) are commercial hidden-service
websites that operate on The Onion Router (Tor) anonymity network. Cryptomar-
kets accept primarily bitcoin as payment since bitcoin is pseudonymous. Under-
standing bitcoin transaction patterns in cryptomarkets is important for analyzing
vulnerabilities of privacy protection models in cryptocurrecies. It is also impor-
tant for law enforcement to track illicit online crime activities in cryptomarkets. In
this paper, we discover interesting characteristics of bitcoin transaction patterns
in cryptomarkets. The results demonstrate that the privacy protection mechanism
in cryptomarkets and bitcoin is vulnerable. Adversaries can easily gain valuable
information for analyzing trading activities in cryptomarkets.
Keywords: Cryptomarket · Cryptocurrency · Bitcoin · Peeling Chain
1 Introduction
The darknet is a portion of the Internet that purposefully protects the identities and
privacy of both web servers and clients. The Onion Router (Tor) is the most popular in-
stance of a darknet and also the most popular anonymous network. Tor provides hidden
services (also known as onion services) for users to hide their locations and identities
while offering web publishing services. A cryptomarket (or darknet market) is a com-
mercial website operating on the darknet. Specifically, in Tor, a crytomarket is a hidden
service website with a “.onion” link address. Most products being sold in cryptomar-
kets are illicit. Some example popular products in cryptomarkets are drugs, malware,
and stolen credit cards. After the demise of the first cryptomarket called Silk Road on
2013, new cryptomarkets have proliferated. As of March 2019, we have observed at
least 35 active cryptomarkets. Table 1 shows the largest six cryptomarkets at present
according to the total number of ads listed in each market.
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Table 1: Cryptomarkets and their accepted cryptocurrencies as of March 2019
Cryptomarkets #Ads Bitcoin Monero Litecoin Ethereum Bitcoin Cash
Dream 166, 216 X X
Berlusconi 38, 462 X
Wall Street 16, 847 X X
Empire 9, 538 X X X
Point Tochka 6, 468 X X X
Silk Road 3.1 5, 738 X X X X
From Table 1, we can see that bitcoin is accepted in all cryptomarkets. In addition to bit-
coin, four other types of cryptocurrencies are also accepted by different markets. They
are monero, litecoin, ethereum, and bitcoin cash. Note that bitcoin cash is a variant of
but different than bitcoin and is an independent currency. Bitcoin cash is generally con-
sidered to be faster in the transaction confirmation process but less secure than bitcoin.
In our study, we focus on bitcoin since it is the most popular cryptocurrency and widely
accepted by all markets. The observed bitcoin transaction patterns in this paper provide
insights for analyzing other types of cryptocurrencies.
Bitcoin is the first decentralized cryptocurrency (also known as digital currency or elec-
tronic cash). Bitcoin operates on the peer-to-peer network without the need for inter-
mediaries and there are no central banks or administrators. Transactions are verified
by network nodes via cryptography and recorded in a public distributed ledger called
a blockchain. Bitcoin has millions of unique users. Bitcoin is pseudonymous because
funds are not tied to real-world entities but rather bitcoin addresses. Owners of bitcoin
addresses are not explicitly identified, but all transactions on the blockchain are public.
Since all bitcoin transactions are public, it is hard to fully protect the privacy of bitcoin
users. The news have revealed that adversaries could spy on a careless company by
first paying it in bitcoins and then tracking how that money flows [4, 6, 3]. For better
protecting the privacy, bitcoin users have extensively used mixing services to obscure
the bitcoin trails [4].
In cryptomarkets, adversaries could place orders and then track money flows. Cryp-
tomarkets display the buyers’ feedback in order to demonstrate the vendors’ reputation.
Figure 1 shows the screenshot of the feedback page in the Dream Market. From Figure
1, we can see the post time, rating star, text comment, masked buyer ID, and approxi-
mate amount of money. Each rating actually represents a bitcoin transaction. Even we
can only observe approximate time and money in ratings, the accumulation of a lot of of
such approximate transaction records could potentially allow adversaries to reveal rele-
vant bitcoin addresses. Figure 2 shows the screenshot of the feedback page in the Wall
Street Market. From Figure 2, we can observe similar ratings. All markets in Table 1
display feedback publicly. This potentially allows adversaries to re-identify the bitcoin
addresses of buyers, vendors, and escrow accounts in cryptomarkets, thus increases the
vulnerability of the privacy protection in bitcoin.
In this paper, we systematically study the vulnerabilities of bitcoin privacy that exist
in cryptomarkets. We identify and categorize patterns of bitcoin transactions in cryp-
tomarkets. The observations are then used for discussing the possibility of re-identifying
bitcoin addresses related to crytomarkets. The conclusions obtained from this paper can
help design better bitcoin payment systems and strengthen the privacy protection. On
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Fig. 1: The feedback in the Dream Market
Fig. 2: The feedback in the Wall Street Market
the other hand, the conclusions can also be used by law enforcement to understand the
activities in cryptomarkets.
2 Escrow Services in Cryptomarkets
In this section, we review the escrow services in cryptomarkets. All cryptomarkets pro-
vide escrow services to avoid scams and protect both buyers and vendors.
Figure 3 shows the typical process of one transaction [12]. The buyer places an order
and pays with bitcoins after browsing the products within the Tor web browser. The
market holds the bitcoins until the buyer confirms the order. The vendor accepts and
fulfills the order. The buyer confirms the order and gives feedback reviews. The market
releases the bitcoins to the vendor and charges a commission fee. If the buyer is not
satisfied with the product or service, the buyer disputes the order. In this case, the market
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Fig. 3: A flowchart depicting a transaction in cryptomarkets
decides where the escrow bitcoins go. The escrow bitcoins go either back to the buyer
or to the vendor depending on the dispute result.
3 Parsing and Understanding Bitcoin Transactions
To trace the bitcoin flow, we parse the blocks in the public bitcoin blockchain and
obtain the bitcoin transactions. We install the bitcoin core program [2] and run a bitcoin
full node [7]. The bitcoin full node automatically synchronizes with other nodes in the
bitcoin network, and downloads all blocks in the blockchain. The blocks contain the
public ledger data and are the inputs of our parsing algorithm. A new block is generated
around every 10 minutes.
Algorithm 1 shows our parsing algorithm. We use the existing Python bitcoin parser to
parse the blocks (raw Bitcoin data) and construct the bitcoin transaction tree [5, 1]. In
Algorithm 1, we parse the blocks one by one (lines 1-12) and save one timestamp for
all transactions in one block (line 2). For each transaction in one block, we parse the
transaction hash (line 5), the receiver list (lines 6-8), and the sender list (lines 9-11).
Each transaction contains four parts: timestamp, hash, sender list, and receiver list, and
is written into a json file (line 12). One receiver contains the bitcoin address and the
bitcoin values. Each sender in one transaction does not contain bitcoin address neither
bitcoin value. Instead, each sender contains transaction hash and index pointing to an
earlier transaction. We can use that transaction hash to retrieve the earlier transaction
and use the transaction index to find the referred receiver from the receiver list. By
linking the sender in current transaction with the receiver in the earlier transaction, we
can generate a bitcoin transaction flow tree.
Algorithm 2 shows the construction of bitcoin transaction flow tree. Algorithm 2 pro-
cesses the json files in the chronological order. This guarantees that old transactions
will be processed earlier than new transactions. Since a receiver has bitcoin address,
we can directly add a node (transaction hash, bitcoin address) to the flow tree. Since
a sender does not have bitcoin address, we need to look it up in an earlier transaction.
Since earlier transactions have been processed, the sender must exist in the node set V
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Algorithm 1 Parsing Bitcoin Transactions
Input: Blocks in the bitcoin blockchain
Output: Bitcoin transactions (a set of .json files whose names are formatted timestamps)
1: for each block do
2: transaction time⇐ block.timestamp;
3: create a new file: formatted transaction timestamp.json;
4: for each transaction in the block.transactions do
5: transaction hash⇐ transaction.this transaction hash;
6: receiver list = [] ;
7: for each receiver in the transaction.receivers do
8: receiver list.add(receiver.index, receiver.bitcoin address, receiver.bitcoin value)
9: sender list = [] ;
10: for each sender in the transaction.senders do
11: sender list.add(sender.index, sender.previous transaction hash,
sender.previous transaction index)
12: [transaction time, transaction hash, sender list, receiver list]⇒
formatted transaction timestamp.json
Algorithm 2 Constructing Bitcoin Transaction Flow Tree
Input: Bitcoin transactions (a set of .json files whose names are formatted timestamps)
Output: Bitcoin transaction flow tree G(V,E)
1: read the list of json files;
2: for each json file (process them in the chronological order) do
3: read all transactions in the json file;
4: for each transaction tx do
5: for each receiver in tx.receiver list do
6: add node r = [tx.transaction hash, receiver.index, receiver.bitcoin address,
receiver.bitcoin value] to the node set V ;
7: for each sender in tx.sender list do
8: find node s ∈ V with s.transaction hash = sender.previous transaction hash
and s.index = sender.index;
9: add an edge (s, r) to the edge set E;
as a receiver. Therefore, we search over all the nodes in V and compare the transac-
tion hash and index values (lines 8). Then we add an edge from this earlier receiver to
the current receiver in flow tree. If there are multiple senders and receivers in a mixing
transaction, these senders and receivers will form a complete bipartite graph, i.e., there
is an edge from any sender to any receiver. We do not know who sends money to whom
in a mixing transaction.
Algorithm 3 shows a local search algorithm that retrieves a subtree containing all nodes
that are k-hop away from the query node. The query node is determined by the trans-
action hash and bitcoin address. In our experiment, we use Algorithm 3 to extract a
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Algorithm 3 Local search algorithm for extracting a subtree
Input: Bitcoin transaction flow tree G(V,E), query q = (q hash, q btc address), k hops
Output: Subtree G[T ]
1: ignore the edge direction, G.Adj[u] represents the neighbors;
2: for each node v ∈ V do v.d =∞ ;
3: S ⇐ {q}; T ⇐ {}; q.d = 0;
4: while True do
5: extract node u with minimum u.d value among all nodes in the set S − T ;
6: if u.d > k then break;
7: T ⇐ T ∪ u; S ⇐ S ∪G.Adj[u];
8: for each node x in G.Adj[u] do x.d = min{x.d, u.d+ 1} ;
subtree given an query node containing our bitcoin address. The subtree is nimble for
us to analyze interesting patterns.
Fig. 4: shadow address
Shadow Address: Bitcoin creates a new address for the sender
in each transaction to obtain better anonymity [15]. The newly
generated address is called “shadow address” or “change ad-
dress” of the original address of the sender [8]. Figure 4 shows
one bitcoin transaction. The sender’s original address has B.09.
After B.05 is sent to the receiver, the sender still has B.04 in the
change address.
Fig. 5: multi-inputs
Multiple inputs and single output: Considering the multiple ad-
dresses one user can own, bitcoin supports a user to send bit-
coins from multiple addresses in one transaction. Figure 5 shows
one bitcoin transaction containing multiple inputs and one out-
put. The sender sends money from four bitcoin addresses to the
receiver’s address. We assume that it is unlikely that two senders
send money to the same address at the same time since the bit-
coin addresses keep changing. If we observe a transaction with
multiple inputs and single output, we can assume all input ad-
dresses belong to the same sender.
These two properties help track bitcoin flows or cluster addresses into wallets [14, 8,
10].
Fig. 6: A mixing transaction
Mixing services: are widely used as a privacy
overlay on top of bitcoin [11]. Mixing services
are also known as tumblers. The mixer will mix
several transactions into one, intending to confuse
the trail linking back to the source. In a mixing
transaction, the multiple inputs are from different
senders and the multiple outputs go to different re-
ceivers. Mixing services reduce the traceability of
bitcoin flows which makes the analysis of bitcoin
graph more difficult. Figure 6 shows a mixing transaction with four senders and three
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receivers. In this example, we do not know who send money to whom because there are
multiple possible flows.
4 Actions and Observed Resulting Transactions
In this section, we describe our experiments in cryptomarkets. All cryptomarkets offer
escrow services to avoid scams. With the escrow service, the bitcoin is saved in escrow
accounts after a buyer places an order and is sent to the vendor until the buyer confirms
the order. Since we know the start point (buyer address) of the transaction, we can trace
bitcoin flows to uncover escrow and vendors’ addresses.
Table 2: Observed bitcoin flow from operation in different cryptomarkets
Cryptomarkets Deposit Withdraw Order Confirm
Point Tochka X X X X
Dream X X No observation No observation
Empire X X No observation No observation
Silk Road 3.1 X X No observation No observation
Wall Street No such function No such function X X
Berlusconi No such function No such function X No observation
In each market, four operations are performed: deposit, withdraw, order, and confirma-
tion. The resulting transactions may or may not be observed in the bitcoin transaction
flow. Table 2 shows whether we can observe the bitcoin transactions for the four opera-
tions in cryptomarkets. From Table 2, we can see that the Dream, Empire, and SilkRoad
3.1 Market operate in a similar way. These markets require buyers to deposit bitcoins
first. When buyers withdraw bitcoins from the market, the market will send bitcoins
to buyers’ wallets from an address different than the deposit address. When we order
or confirm a purchase, we cannot observe any transactions in bitcoin flow. The Point
Tochka Market also requires deposit. When we order and confirm a purchase in the
Point Tochka Market, we can observe the transactions from buyer to escrow and then
to vendor in the bitcoin flow. The Wall Street and Berlusconi Markets do not require
deposit. In the Wall street Market, when we order and confirm a purchase, we can also
observe the corresponding transactions in the bitcoin flow. In the Berlusconi Market, we
can observe the transactions in bitcoin flow when we order. The bitcoins sent to escrow
are transferred to other escrow addresses through mixing service before we confirm the
purchase. Therefore, we cannot observe the transaction when we conform the purchase.
Table 3: Deposit and Withdrawal in the Point Tochka Market
Action
Observed bitcoin transaction
BalanceSender Receiver
Deposit B.0024 A1: B.0030 B1: B.0024, A2: B.0006 B.0024
Withdraw B.0008 B1: B.0024 A2: B.0008, B1: B.0016 B.0016
Deposit B.0010 A2: B.0006, A2: B.0008 B1: B.0026, A3: B.0004 B.0026
Withdraw B.0006 B1: B.0026 A3: B.0006, B1: B.0020 B.0020
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In the next, we will study the bitcoin transaction patterns when we interact with the mar-
kets. We first study the deposit and withdrawal actions and then the order and confirma-
tion actions. In each market, four operations are performed: deposit B.0024, withdraw
B.0008, deposit B.0010, and withdraw B.0006. We monitor the bitcoin transaction flow
to see whether we can observe any related transactions or not. To simplify the illustra-
tion, we omit the fees charged during the deposit and withdrawal actions.
Deposit and Withdrawal in the Point Tochka Market: Table 3 shows the actions
we perform and the resulting bitcoin transactions in the Point Tochka Market. In Table
3, each row represents an action we perform and the resulting Bitcoin transaction. We
use letter “A” followed by an integer to represent our bitcoin addresses and letter “B”
followed by an integer to represent the deposit bitcoin addresses provided by the market.
For example, in the first row, we deposit B.0024 and the resulting transaction is “A1:
B.0030 → B1: B.0024, A2: B.0006”. In the sender part “A1: B.0030”, A1 represents
our bitcoin address and B.0030 represents the money in that address. In the receiver
part “B1: B.0024, A2: B.0006”, B1 represents the deposit bitcoin address provided by
the Point Tochka Market, B.0024 represents the money that B1 receives, A2 represents
our new bitcoin address, and B.0006 represents the change in the new address A2. The
last column in Table 3 shows the balance in the market wallet.
In the second row of Table 3, we withdraw B.0008 and the resulting transaction is “B1:
B.0024 → A2: B.0008, B1: B.0016”. B1 still represents the deposit bitcoin address
and A2 still represents our bitcoin address for receiving the money. We further deposit
B.0010 and withdraw B.0006, and the resulting transactions are shown in Table 3.
From Table 3, we can see that the deposit bitcoin address in the market does not change.
Among all cryptomarkets in Table 1, the Point Tochka Market has the most transparent
bitcoin transaction flows, which can be further confirmed when we study the order and
confirmation actions.
Table 4: Deposit and Withdrawal in the Dream Market
Action
Observed bitcoin transaction
BalanceSender Receiver
Deposit B.0024 A1: B.0030 B1: B.0024, A2: B.0006 B.0024
Withdraw B.0008 B2: B.0008 A2: B.0008 B.0016
Deposit B.0010 A2: B.0006, A2: B.0008 B3: B.0010, A3: B.0004 B.0026
Withdraw B.0006 B4: B.0006 A4: B.0006 B.0020
Deposit and Withdrawal in the Dream Market: We perform the same sequence of
actions in the Dream Market and Table 4 shows the resulting transactions. From Table
4, we can see that the bitcoin address B2 that sends us money during the first withdrawal
is different than the bitcoin address B1 that receives our money during the first deposit.
After the second withdrawal, we find that there is still B.0024 in B1. This means that the
Dream Market uses different bitcoin addresses to receive deposit and send withdrawal.
From the subsequent deposit and withdrawal actions, the deposit is sent to B3 and the
withdrawal is received from B4. This further confirms the observation. This mechanism
makes it harder to track the bitcoin flow, thus better protects the privacy of the market
and prevents the re-identification attack.
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The Empire and Silk Road 3.1 Markets have similar transaction patterns as Dream
Market for the deposit and withdrawal actions. We omit the tables for them. The Wall
Street and Berlusconi Markets provide neither deposit nor withdrawal functions. They
allow buyers directly pay from their own bitcoin addresses.
In the next, we study patterns in the resulting bitcoin transactions for the order and
confirmation actions.
Table 5: Order and Confirmation in the Point Tochka Market
Action
Observed bitcoin transaction
BalanceSender Receiver
Order B.0014 B1: B.0040 C1: B.0014, B1: B.0026 B.0026
Confirm C1: B.0014 D1: B.0014 B.0026
Order B.0015 B1: B.0026 C2: B.0015, B1: B.0011 B.0011
Confirm C2: B.0015 D2: B.0015 B.0011
Order and Confirmation in the Point Tochka Market: We purchase two orders and
Table 5 shows the resulting bitcoin transactions. After we place the first order, the
money is sent from the deposit bitcoin address B1 to an escrow account C1. The bal-
ance is sent back to B1. After the vendor fulfills the order, we confirm it. The money
in the escrow C1 is then immediately transferred to a new bitcoin address D1, which is
suspected of being the vendor’s bitcoin address. In the second order, we pay B0.0015 to
a different vendor. Similar to the transactions in the first order, the money moves to an
escrow account C2 after the order and then moves from C2 to the destination bitcoin ad-
dress after confirmation. The escrow address C2 is different than the old escrow address
C1. From this experiment, we can see that the bitcoin transaction flows are transparent.
For each new order, the market will generate a new escrow bitcoin address. We also ob-
serve that our deposit bitcoin address will not change. By tracking the money flowing
out of the escrow accounts, we can potentially find the suspicious bitcoin addresses of
vendors.
Table 6: Order and Confirmation in the Dream Market
Action
Observed bitcoin transaction
BalanceSender Receiver
Order B.0014 B1: B.0040 does not change B.0026
Confirm B1: B.0040 still no change. No transactions observed B.0026
Order B.0015 B1: B.0040 does not change B.0011
Confirm B1: B.0040 still no change. No transactions observed B.0011
Order and Confirmation in the Dream Market: We also purchase two products in
the Dream Market and Table 6 shows the resulting transactions. After we place the first
order of B0.0014, we find that no transaction associated with the deposit bitcoin address
B1 happen. After the vendor fulfills the order and we confirm it, still nothing happens.
This means Dream Market uses a different escrow bitcoin address to pay the vendor and
the money in the original deposit address B1 does not move. Since we know neither the
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escrow address used to pay the vendor nor the vendor bitcoin address, there is no easy
way for us to observe the relevant transactions. We suspect that the Dream Market has
its own private ledger to record the balances of the deposit and escrow accounts for
each user. After each order, the bitcoin in the deposit account will be transferred to
the escrow account. After each confirmation, the bitcoin in the escrow account will be
transferred out to vendor’s accounts. The ledger of Dream Market might be a private
and centralized ledger. This strategy makes the transactions within the Dream Market
stealthy and cannot be seen from the public. This strategy well protects the privacy of
the market and vendors.
Table 7: Order and Confirmation in the Wall Street Market
Action
Observed bitcoin transaction
Sender Receiver
Order B.0014 A1: B.0040 C1: B.0014, A2: B.0026
Confirm C1: B.0014 is transferred to another address through mixing
Order B.0015 A2: B.0026 C2: B.0015, A3: B.0011
Confirm C2: B.0015 is transferred to another address through mixing
Order and Confirmation in the Wall Street Market: The Wall Street Market does
not have deposit function. It allows us to pay directly with our bitcoin address. When
we purchase, we are required to send a specific amount of bitcoin to a newly generated
escrow address and to provide a bitcoin address for receiving the refund if the order
fails. Following this procedure, we purchase two products. Table 7 shows the resulting
transactions. After we place the first order, we can see the escrow address C1. After we
confirm the order, we can observe that the money in the escrow C1 is transferred to a
new bitcoin address through a mixing service. Since there are multiple receivers, we do
not know which one is the receiver corresponding to the escrow C1.
Table 8: Order and Confirmation in the Berlusconi Market
Action
Observed bitcoin transaction
Sender Receiver
Order B.0014 A1: B.0040 C1: B.0014, A2: B.0026
Confirm C1: B.0014 is transferred to another address through mixing
Order B.0015 A2: B.0026 C2: B.0015, A3: B.0011
Confirm C2: B.0015 is transferred to another address through mixing
Order and Confirmation in the Berlusconi Market: The Berlusconi Market does not
have deposit function neither. We directly pay with our bitcoin address and Table 8
shows the resulting transactions. After we place the first order, we can see the escrow
address C1. But before we confirm the order, the money in the escrow C1 is already
transferred to a new bitcoin address through the mixing service. This makes it hard
for us to track the bitcoin flows. Similar pattern is observed for the second order. The
Berlusconi Market applies mixing services on escrow addresses to further protect the
privacy of the market and vendors.
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Since the Wall Street and Point Tochka Markets provide more transparent bitcoin trans-
action patterns, the feedback reviews may help re-identify the bitcoin addresses of ven-
dors. A feedback review is usually posted right after the buyer confirms the order. Each
review represents an approximate bitcoin transaction including approximate date and
money. We will see more details in the next sections.
5 Bitcoin Transaction Patterns in the Dream Market
In this section, we track back the bitcoin flows of the withdrawal operation in Dream
Market with Algorithm 3. We find a bitcoin address containing more than 800 bitcoins
which is worth over 3 million dollars at present, and it collects those bitcoins from
multiple addresses in one transaction. Figure 7 shows part of the flow tree we observed.
The red node represents our bitcoin address for receiving money in the withdrawal. We
observe a bitcoin transaction pattern called “peeling chain” [14].
Peeling Chain: The head of a peeling chain is a bitcoin address with a lot of bitcoins. A
small amount of bitcoin is peeled off from this address in a transaction and a ”Shadow
address” is generated to collect the remaining and still large amount of bitcoin. By
repeating this process, the large amount of bitcoin can be peeled down. Peeling chain
is popular for organizations dealing with a lot of clients. The bitcoin addresses in a
peeling chain are not necessary the addresses of Dream escrow accounts. They might
be exchange addresses [9].
Fig. 7: Bitcoin “peeling chain” patterns in the Dream Market
The head of this peeling chain is a bitcoin address which receives more than 800 bit-
coins. In each transaction, 10 bitcoins are transferred to a new address and the remaining
amount is transferred to the shadow address. We call these blue addresses in the main
chain the first level escrow addresses. Each of the addresses containing 10 Bitcoins be-
comes a head of a new smaller peeling chain. In this new chain, one transaction peels
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off even smaller amount of bitcoin to pay different users. We call the green addresses
in the smaller peeling chains the second level escrow addresses. The bitcoins peeled off
from the second order addresses are send to third level escrow address, which are white
nodes in Figure 7. The white nodes directly send bitcoins to users (red nodes) of dream
market. The amount of bitcoin received by the third order escrow address is exactly the
number of bitcoins required by users. No shadow addresses are generated.
In addition to this pattern, we also notice that the mixing pattern from the third order
escrow addresses to users’ addresses. The Dream market allows users to use mixing
services. Users need to pay a certain percentage of fees to use mixing services when
they withdraw bitcoins.
Clustering bitcoin addresses: The peeling chain patterns can potentially help cluster
bitcoin addresses of users in the Dream Market. Since we can track the peeling chain
easily, we may be able to identify other transactions happening in the Dream Market by
comparing the white-red transactions with the feedback reviews.
6 Bitcoin Transaction Patterns in the Wall Street Market
In this section, we explore the possibility of linking Wall Street feedback reviews with
bitcoin transactions. We order a product “Spotify Premium Lifetime Warranty” and pay
$1.25 on about 4:40 pm, March 5, 2019, then we confirm the order and write a review
by 01:36 am, March 8, 2019. Figure 8 shows some feedback reviews. In Figure 8, the
fourth review is written by us and “u***y” is our account ID. Since we know our bitcoin
address “15v3...”, we track the money flow.
Table 9 shows the transaction relevant to the order action. The output address “33sY...”
is the escrow account, and the other output address “14ZK...” is the shadow address
containing our remaining money. Table 10 shows the transaction relevant to the con-
firmation action. It is a mixing transaction containing 24 inputs and 22 outputs. The
escrow address “33sY...” is in the sender list. Table 10 shows top three output addresses
whose receiving bitcoins are most close to the money we send. By comparing the bit-
coins of the three outputs with our money $1.25, we can see that output address “3Jpp...”
is most likely to be the vendor’s address. We can also see that the transaction happens
at 2019-03-08 02:06, which is 30 minutes later than our review time 01:36 am.
We further explore the transactions related to “3Jpp...”. Table 11 shows the list of trans-
actions relevant to the reviews in Figure 8. For example, the first transaction happens at
2019-03-08 23:07 and the amount of money is $1.12, which matches with the feedback
review “H***e - 03/08 10:49 pm - 1.25 USD”. The time of the transaction is 18-minute
later than the time of review. Comparing the reviews in Figure 8 with the transactions in
Table 10 and 11, we can see we successfully find the transactions of four reviews. For
the first and sixth reviews in Figure 8, we do not find them manually. This is because
the vendor may have multiple bitcoin address for receiving money and “3Jpp...” might
be just one of them.
We purchase the product again and find the same bitcoin address “3Jpp...” receiving the
money. This further confirms that “3Jpp...” belongs to the vendor.
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Fig. 8: Feedback Ratings in the Wall Street Market
Table 9: The bitcoin transaction relevant to the order action
Hash (txid) 25f33135c87b37205b49a9ade6faa1d6837a4fcb42340270753562b7e1802bee
Time (UTC) 2019-03-05 16:49 Input count: 1 ; Output count: 2
Input 0 15v3cQR4H9iz3nb1tXwNd33ETo7ZEX2wir B.03554909 $132.31
Output 0 33sYgQnBkBkm3mDbWJY6KMoT7no1eNd4j5 B.00032256 $1.20
Output 1 14ZKcens6g6J58kBVGNk3Hs2a94NE3bnUT B.03517496 $130.92
Table 10: The bitcoin transaction relevant to the confirmation action
Feedback u***y - 03/08 01:36 am - 1.25 USD
Hash (txid) 27c4946ad1e5e648e987d66a882d98f08ebcb3bae8d11aea70b9dac7219aa036
Time (UTC) 2019-03-08 02:06 Input count: 24 ; Output count: 22
Input 16 33sYgQnBkBkm3mDbWJY6KMoT7no1eNd4j5 B.00032256 $1.20
Output 8 39o2XAjmFTkSGFrkUPsJRNrDUvUCYiXyP5 B.00061720 $2.39
Output 10 336djQeGFA4etdRv3xRESoKVV3zHr8YvMv B.00020500 $0.79
Output 18 3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV B.00029320 $1.14
Table 11: The bitcoin transactions relevant to the feedback reviews in Fig. 8
Feedback H***e - 03/08 10:49 pm - 1.25 USD
Hash (txid) 5542aaf1c045f951ba7623510237217d97009eb403778cec6ae101d4462583e1
Time (UTC) 2019-03-08 23:07 Input count: 47 ; Output count: 42
Output 40 3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV B.00028800 $1.12
Feedback h***5 - 03/08 06:33 am - 1.25 USD
Hash (txid) bb6a4c9d5c747d941eeb6fc5031973351382cb0550be35bfbefda0c07380b63d
Time (UTC) 2019-03-08 08:26 Input count: 15 ; Output count: 20
Output 19 3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV B.00029290 $1.13
Feedback a***k - 03/07 06:33 pm - 10 USD
Hash (txid) c022177c6bb26a2c3ad82b699bb9d3d950131a8b13dd54665e7f6e4f8d8263a3
Time (UTC) 2019-03-07 19:21 Input count: 35 ; Output count: 38
Output 26 3JppEPMTeUXWY96g5D19k6hhK1QLATdwJV B.00251950 $9.75
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7 Related Work
Ron et al. is the first to build a bitcoin graph and analyze the quantitative attributes
in bitcoin transaction history [16]. Clustering bitcoin addresses into wallets is one ba-
sic task in the bitcoin transaction analysis. Researchers have widely used two simple
heuristics [8, 18, 10]. The first heuristic is to put shadow/change address together with
its input address into one wallet. The second heuristics is to put all input addresses into
one wallet if there is a single output address. Androulaki et al. test the effectiveness
of the bitcoin address clustering methods with stimulation [8]. Spagnuolo et al. link
the clustered wallets to the Silk Road escrow addresses exposed by FBI and analyze
the bitcoin flow [18]. Fleder et al. not only link the clustered wallets with Silk Road
escrow but also link wallets with public wallets [10]. PageRank is then applied on the
transaction graph to find interesting and important wallets [10]. The effectiveness of
address clustering is also studied [13]. Mixing technology is also introduced to improve
the anonymity [17, 19].
8 Conclusion
We find interesting Bitcoin transaction patterns associated with cryptomarkets. The re-
sults demonstrate that the privacy protection mechanism in Bitcoin is still vulnerable in
terms of simple analysis. An adversary can easily gain valuable information for analyz-
ing the activities happening in the markets.
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